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NPS Team 
•  Faculty and Staff 
–  Cynthia Irvine, Thuy Nguyen, Timothy Levin, Paul Clark, John 
Clark, Richard Harkins, Jean Khosalim, Donna Miller, David 
Shifflett, Buddy Vernon, Daniel Warren, Naomi Falby, Matthew 
Rose, Mike Thompson, Phil Hopfner 
•  Current Students 
–  Jeremy Bradney (civ), Jason Cullum (civ), Melissa Egan (civ), Mark 
Estlund (USAF), Patrick Whitehorn (civ), Mark Orwat (USA), Randy 
Avray (USA), Alan Schaffer (USN), Mike Schumann (USMC), 
Daniel DeCloss (civ),  
•  Graduated Students (recent) 
–  Major Francis Afinidad (USAF), Major  David Bibighaus (USAF), 
Catherine Dodge (civ), John Horn (civ), Rob Kane (USN), Jack 
Lysinger (USN), Carrie Ruppar (civ), Chua Chay (Sing. Army), Ng, 
Chee Mung (Sing. Civ), Tan, Nai Kwan (Sing. Civ), Lily Tse (civ) … 
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Agenda 
•  Synergistic Research Projects 
–  Multilevel Testbed and CDS 
–  Trusted Computing Exemplar  




Trusted Computing Exemplar Project 
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Trusted Computing Exemplar 
•  Technical Problem Definition 
•  Social Problem 
•  TCX Concept 
•  High Assurance Kernel 
•  High Assurance Development Framework 
•  Exemplar High Assurance Application 
•  Project Evaluation and Dissemination 
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General Taxonomy of Attacks 
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Attacks: Means, Motive, Opportunity 
•  Means 
–  Skill in system design and artifice construction 
•  Motive 
–  Clandestine access to critical information 
•  Opportunity 
–  Join development team for target system 
–  Modify system design, specifications, or code 
–  Insert artifice during distribution, configuration, 
or maintenance 
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Address Subversion - Limit Opportunity 
•  Need lifecycle assurance 
–  High assurance 
–  Protection via rigorous security engineering 
•  No unspecified functionality 
•  Use of formal verification techniques 
–  When Applied in MLS Context: 
•  Bound information flow  
– Prevents Trojan Horse damage 
•  Uses formal models  
– Supports implementation assessment 
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National Capability Atrophied 
•  Few can construct high assurance systems 
–  Evaluated high assurance secure systems not 
built in past two decades 
•  People dispersed 
•  Systems proprietary 
•  Few teams to evaluate systems 
•  Universities do not know high assurance methods 
–  Vicious cycle - no input for teams 
•  Solution: a high assurance exemplar 
–  NPS has experience and critical mass 
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TCX Integrated Activities 
•  Rapid High Assurance Development Framework 
–  Configuration Management, Engineering Process, … 
–  Semantic programming-based documentation system 
•  Develop High Assurance Security Concepts 
–  Separation Kernel - EAL7 
•  Many student research projects 
–  High Assurance Application 
•  Authentication Device for MLS Trusted Path 
•  Evaluate Components for High Assurance 
–  Developing EAL6+ Separation Kernel Protection Profile 
•  ST will be EAL7 
•  Disseminate Results via Open Methodology 
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•  Define and leverage assurance- and policy-driven 
processes 
•  Focus on efficiency and repeatability 
–  Integrate Tools Specific for High Assurance 
•  Configuration management 
•  Specification and coding 
•  Teamwork and training support 
–  Mentored teams  
•  Transfer of high assurance capabilities 
–  Integrate open methodology for dissemination 
Activity 1: HA Development Framework 
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Support Development Functions 
•  Specification of security properties 
•  Design specification 
•  Verification that security properties are self-
consistent 
•  Code development 
•  Verify that implementation meets its target (& no 
more) 
•  CM of specifications, SW, tools and processes 
•  Specification-based testing 
•  Evaluation support through document structuring 
•  Teamwork and training support 
•  User document support 
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High Assurance Life Cycle Framework 
•  Spiral Life Cycle Model 
–  Augmented With EAL7 Life Cycle Requirements 
•  Rigorous Configuration Management (CM) 
–  Track Changes, Only Authorized Changes Accepted  
–  Ensure Integrity Of Configuration Items 
•  Strict Developmental Security Safeguards 
–  Ensure Confidentiality & Integrity Of TCX Materials 
•  Current Status 
–  Life Cycle Plan 
–  Personnel Security Plan, Physical Security Plan 
–  CM Plan, CM Procedures 
–  Physically Isolated CM System, Perforce CM Software  
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HA  Rapid Development Environment  
•  Evaluation-Driven Processes 
–  Focus on Efficiency and Repeatability 
•  Tools Specific for High Assurance 
–  Automated Documentation Referencing System 
•  Facilitate Traceability and Correspondence Between Spec & Code 
–  Software Development Environment 
•  Processes for Design, Review, Approval, Development 
–  Verification Environment 
•  Verify Correctness of Formal Model and Specifications 
•  Current Status 
–  Documentation Development Standards 
–  XML-Centric Documentation Integration Environment Prototype 
–  Software Development Standards 
–  Protected Development Network Prototype 
–  Verification Tool Sets (FDM, PVS, ACL2, Specware, Spark ADA, 
etc.) 
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•  Security Policy and Formal Model 
–  Model mapped to policy 
–  Model consistency proof 
–  Model captures salient system abstractions 
•  Formal High Level Specification 
–  Formally mapped to model 
–  Basis for Test Plan 
•  Demonstrate presence and absence of functionality 
•  Implementation  
–  mapped to FHLS 
•  Covert channel analysis 
•  Lifecycle configuration management 
Apply Developmental High Assurance 
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•  Configuration Management System 
–  Detailed Design & Implementation 
Procedures 
–  Initial Baselines for all Configuration Items 
•  High Assurance Development Environment 
Plan 
–  Development Tools 
–  Programming Language Survey 
•  Hardware Platform Survey and Analysis 
•  Hardware Specific Development Tools Under 
CM 
Status: Configuration Management 
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•  Embedded Separation-Kernel 
•  Network Trusted Path Extension Appliance 
•  High Assurance applied for entire lifecycle 
–  Design, implementation, distribution, 
maintenance 
–  Evaluatable processes 
Activity 2: Develop HA Components 
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TCX Separation Kernel 
•  Simple, Compact, Structured to be Evaluatable at EAL7 
–  Static Security and Resource Configuration 
•  Flow Control 
–  Process and Data-Domain Separation 
•  Access Control Policy 
–  Static Process/Resource Access Bindings 
•  Basic Kernel Services 
–  Static Scheduling 
–  IPC via Shared Memory Segments and Simple Synchronization 
Primitives 
–  Device Interrupts Handling 
•  Current Status 
–  Threats and Security Requirements Analysis  
•  Working with NSA to Develop EAL6+ Protection Profile 
–  Least Privilege Separation Model 
•  Demonstrated using Formal Development Methodology Tool Set 
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Separation Kernel 
•  Static resource allocation reduces “covert channels” 
–  Fixed number of processes and subjects 
–  Fixed subject/resource bindings 
•  Results in global and persistent policy enforcement 
–  Fixed scheduling allotments per block 
•  Entities within block share allotment 
–  Kernel mechanisms to handle asynchronous interrupts 
•  I/O handled by kernel 
•  Presented to processes via memory segments 
–  IPC via shared memory segments 
•  Simple synchronization primitives 
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•  Access Control Policy 
–  Static runtime process/resource binding 
•  in equivalence classes or blocks 
–  Enforce process and inter-block separation 
–  Can support lattice-based domain policies 
–  Inherent support for least privilege: LPSK 
•  Verification Properties 
–  Process Isolation 
•  controlled communications 
–  Covert Channel 
•  Simplified by static resource allocation 
Separation Kernel - continued 
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Status- Requirements Specification 
•  TCX Kernel Security Target  
–  Based on SKPP 
–  Preliminary draft created 
–  Will include EAL 7 requirements 
•  Some Common Criteria requirements extend high 
assurance security engineering 
•  NPS providing interpretations for review 
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•  Model Application 
•  TPE functions 
–  Gatekeeper between workstation and LAN 
•  High assurance separation via TCX separation kernel 
•  Isolate untrusted workstation until session established 
–  High assurance mutual authentication  
•  Remote Multilevel Secure (MLS) Server 
–  Login and Session Level negotiation 
•  Configured Commercial (COTS) Client Workstation 
–  MLS Session-level negotiation, encryption, etc. 
•  Software Structure 
–  Layered component built on top of LPSK 
•  Hardware 
–  Appliance form factor (handheld scale) 
•  User input and display devices 
Trusted Path Extension 
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•  Application (layer 2) 
–  move packets between LAN and workstation 
•  Trusted Path Policy (layer 1) 
–  Manage I/O between remote TCB and user 
•  Login 
•  Session-level negotiation 
–  Ensure workstation isolation until session established 
–  Ensure workstation isolated from Trusted path dialogs 
–  Secure communication tunnel 
•  Separation-Kernel (isolation policy) configuration 
–  ensure packet mediation between LAN and workstation 
TPE Layered Design 
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•  EA6+ Separation Kernel protection profile 
–  Common Criteria model and guidelines 
–  Working with NSA team 
–  Contribute comments to CC evolution 
•  Basis for EAL7 Security Target 
–  Objective to be compliant to EAL6+ SKPP 
•  Basis for third-party evaluation 
•  Basis for subsequent layer 1 and layer 2 
evaluations at EAL6 
Activity 3: High Assurance Evaluation 
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•  Provide how-to examples for high assurance 
–  Previously unavailable 
–  Document HA development framework, 
techniques, social model 
–  Distribute in open web-based format 
•  Security Target and other requirements documents 
•  Source code, development framework, plans, etc.  
•  Evaluation evidence and reports, including 
–  Formal model 
–  Formal Specification 
–  Covert channel analysis 
Activity 4: Disseminate via Open Methodology 
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Dissemination System Status 
•  System-level requirements defined 
•  Under development 
–  Dissemination System detailed requirements 
–  Policies and procedures 
–  Manual dissemination system 
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•  Evaluatable Reference Implementation 
•  Components with a priori Assurance Against 
System Subversion 
•  Public Availability of High Assurance 
Development Framework 
•  Transfer to Next Generation 
–  New Experts in Security Development 
–  High Assurance Knowledge and Capabilities 
TCX Benefits 
Protection Profile Development 
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Separation Kernel Protection Profile 
•  Separation kernels in DoD programs 
–  JTRS, JSF, etc. 
•  NPS  
–  Needs for Protection Profile for TCX 
–  Provides objective support for PP development 
•  SKPP initial draft July 2004 
•  Final draft in progress 
–  Compliant with Common Criteria Version 2.2 
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Benefits of SKPP Effort 
•  Better understanding of CC Methodology 
•  Contribute to future version of CC 
–  Explicit high assurance requirements that 
should be in CC 
•  Development of methodology for informally 
specified systems 
•  Basis for TCX Security Target 
•  Participation in definition of assurance 
requirements for future systems 
January 2006 34 
Project Description 
•  DoN needs shared printing capability in multilevel environment 
•  Establish security requirements for dedicated multilevel print server 
(MPS) 
–  Utilize Separation Kernel technology 
–  Support HP PCL 5 printer protocol 
•  MPS must be certifiable and accreditable  
–  Meet DoDD 8500.1 and DoDI 8600.2 requirements  
•  Use Common Criteria (CC) framework 
–  CC Version 2.2 
–  Initial goal:  Draft Protection Profile (PP) 
–  Draft PP as basis for development of formal PP or Security Target  
–  Evaluation Assurance Level: EAL4 with augmentation  
•  Methodically designed, tested and reviewed 
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Accomplishments 
•  Phase 1 
–  Draft PP as Masters Thesis 
•  December 2004  à  June 2005 
•  Extensions to several Common Criteria requirements  
•  Extrapolation from existing guidance and examples 
–  US Medium Robustness Consistency Instruction Manual 
–  Medium Robustness MLS OS PP 
•  Phase 2 
–  Common Criteria Version 3.0 
–  Translation process started November 2005 
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System Overview 
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System Characteristics 
•  MLS Print Server 
–  Handle print jobs of different sensitivity levels 
–  Physically isolated and protected 
–  Act as a proxy, transparent to users 
•  Single-level client systems 
–  Sensitivity levels determined by attached network interface  
•  Printers 
–  Located on system high network, physically protected 
–  Two configurations:  dedicated, networked 
•  Print jobs 
–  Preloaded delimiter pages reflect sensitivity level of sender 
–  Use of delimiter pages differs for each printer configuration 
–  Manual sorting by trusted administrative users 
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Security Functionality 
•  Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
–  Control the use of system resources based on DoD data sensitivity 
classification model  
•  Administrative Access Control (AAC) 
–  Restrict access to objects based on user’s administrative role 
bound to a subject  
•  Identification and Authentication (I&A) 
–  Uniquely identify and authenticate administrative users before 
allowing access to system resources 
•  Trusted Path 
–  Provide administrative users direct link to the I&A functions for AAC 
enforcement 
•  Audit  
–  Allow security administrators to detect and analyze potential 
security violations.  
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Target of Evaluation (TOE) 
•  Trusted base 
–  Hardware, Separation Kernel 
•  Trusted partitions (TSF) 
–  Runtime 
•  MLS Services 
•  System High Services 
–  Initialization 
•  Single-level partitions 
–  Print spoolers, one per input port 
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Trusted Security Functions (TSF) 
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Multilevel Components 
•  Separation Kernel 
–  Enforce information flows control policy between partitions 
–  Enforce MAC policy via its configuration data 
–  Configuration data determine static runtime behavior 
•  All resource allocations  
•  All allowed information flows   
•  Sensitivity level of partitions 
•  Binding of input ports and partitions 
•  MLS Services 
–  Enforce MAC supporting policy for print job labeling 
•  Map sensitivity level of jobs based on level of spooler partition 
•  Label jobs with human readable markings 
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System High Services 
•  Administrative Access Control Services 
–  Enforce ACC policy to restrict access to objects based on User IDs 
bound to the administrative subjects 
–  Identification and authentication of administrative users 
–  Trusted path for administrative operations 
•  Audit Logger 
–  Manage audit log 
•  Audit records generated in partitions where events occurred 
•  Runtime Tools 
–  Audit analysis, export audit data to external entity 
•  Configuration Tools 
–  Create, manage MPS configuration data 
•  Printer Services 
–  Filter embedded PJL code, transfer jobs to printers 
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Non-TSF Components 
•  Single-level print spooler 
–  Service print requests from clients 
–  Manage job queues 
–  Format and filter print jobs  
–  Pass processed jobs to Delimiter Page Handler in MLS 
partition  
–  LPRng-like implementation 
•  Initialization 
–  Read MPS configuration data 
–  Establish MPS runtime configuration 
–  Execute once, remain inactive during runtime 
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Print Job Data Flow 
Job  
Queues 
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Error Message Flow 
Job  
Queues 
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Scope of Draft MPS PP 
•  Requirements derivation is iterative 
•  Require traceability between activities 
–  Demonstrated by evidential material defined as rationale 
description 
•  Draft PP only includes 
–  TOE description 
–  Security environment description 
–  Security functional requirements  
–  Security assurance requirements 
•  Draft PP lacks  
–  Traceability analysis & rationale description 
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Security Environment & Objectives 
•  Security environment 
–  Threats (16) 
–  Assumptions (8) 
–  Organizational Security Policies (6) 
•  Security objectives 
–  TOE security objectives (24) 
–  Security objectives for TOE environment (9) 
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Threats, Assumptions, Policies 
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Security Objectives 
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Security Requirements 
•  Derived from security objectives 
•  Security functional requirements (SFR) 
–  CC groups SFRs into 11 Classes  
–  MPS PP includes  
•  9 Classes for TOE 
•  1 Class for TOE environment 
•  Security assurance requirements (SAR) 
–  Specify constraints and quality 
–  EAL 4 with augmentation 
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Security Functional Requirements 
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Security Assurance Requirements 
•  Base requirements for EAL 4 
•  Extended requirements include 
–  Flaw remediation procedures 
–  Assurance maintenance plan 
–  Administrative guidance regarding proper setting of 
configuration data 
•  MAC enforcement:  SK configuration data 
•  MAC supporting:  MPS configuration data 
–  Administrative guidance regarding proper handling of 
printed material 
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Transition to CC V3.0 
•  Developed using CC V2.2 
•  CC V3.0 significantly different 
–  SFR:  6 classes instead of 11 
•  FCS, FMT, FPR, FRU, FTP:  removed/integrated into other 
classes 
•  New class:  Miscellaneous (FMI) 
–  SAR:  ADV rewrite, new Composition class (ACO) 
•  Challenges include 
–  Mapping of affected requirements 
–  Composite evaluation 
–  V3.1 scheduled to be released in July 2006 
•  Synergistic with SKPP V3.0  transition effort 
•  Anticipated completion in April 2006 
 
SecureCore 
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Focus 1 
•  Problem 
–  New DoD systems are based on an untried 
system security architecture 
•  MILS 
–  Solution 
•  Develop new system security architecture with 
proper use of emerging “high robustness separation 
kernel” technologies  
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Focus 1: Optimize Use of Separation Kernel 
Architecture 
•  Separation Kernel used in 
–  F-35, F22, Joint Tactical Radio System, C-17A 
Globemaster III, and Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle 
•  Question of cost, efficiency and security of 
–  Current system architecture 
•  MILS 
–  Vs. other approaches 
•  MLS security kernel 
•  Domain and type enforcement 
•  New separation kernel-based architecture provides 
–  Point for analysis and comparison 
–  Functional and assurance improvements over MILS 
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Focus 2 
•  Problem: 
–  Future DoD security policies lack foundational 
technical support 
1.  Dynamic and adaptive security 
2.  Dissemination-control 
–  e.g., ORCON 
•  Solution: 
–  Develop sound foundations for temporal and 
event-based access control 
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Focus 2a: Dynamic Security Policies 
•  Access control policy may need to adapt to 
situational changes 
–  Inconsistent with traditional models and 
approaches 
•  Uncharted territory 
–  New temporal/event model addresses 
significant subset 
•  Access denied after time or event occurs 
•  Access denied until time or event occurs 
–  Complementary to other security models 
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Focus 2b:  
Dissemination Control 
•  Longstanding technical problem 
•  Solutions likely to enable new global information 
management solutions 
•  New temporal/event enforcement mechanisms 
–  Can make data “disappear” 
•  After an untoward event 
–  e.g., signal that device was captured 
•  After time period 
–  e.g., 24 hours without login 
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SecureCore 
•  Trustworthy Commodity Computation and Communication 
•  Sponsor: NSF and DARPA 
•  Partners: Princeton and USC/ISI 
•  Objective 
–  Design secure integrated core architectures for trustworthy 
operation of mobile computing devices 
•  Includes  
–  Security-aware SecureCore hardware 
–  SecureCore Least Privilege Separation Kernel 
–  SecureCore Security Services 
–  Secure communications 
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Secure Core Clean-Slate Approach 
•  Examine past and current mechanisms 
•  Understand context of mechanisms 
–  Hard 30 years ago but easy today? 
–  Easy years ago but increasingly difficult now? 
•  Combine of past, present and new techniques 
–  Utilize the best of emerging technology 
–  Create new mechanisms as needed 
•  Develop  
–  Security architecture to achieve objectives 
–  Base for experimentation  
–  Metrics for analysis 
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Accomplishments to Date 
•  System-level description  
•  Architectural definition 
•  New comprehensive study of security design 
principles 
•  New conceptual model of temporal access control 
•  Integrated hardware-software mechanism for 
temporal access control and revocation 
•  Hardware-enhanced secure object reuse 
mechanism 
•  Hardware simulator prototype to study  
–  Low-level system constructs 
–  New hardware mechanisms 
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Design Principles for Security 
•  Design principles key to project were identified 
–  Technical Report prepared 
•  6-month deliverable 
–  Will guide subsequent development 
–  Available on NPS website 
•  http://cisr.nps.navy.mil/projects/securecore.html 
–  Currently being used in NPS Secure Systems 
class 
•  Provides roadmap for in depth topics. 
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System Architecture - Context 
•  Mobile Devices 
–  Resource Constrained 
–  Hostile Environments - full threat gamut 
–  Wireless, ad hoc networks 
•  Security-aware 
–  Requirements for policy flexibility while ensuring 
baseline confidentiality and integrity 
–  Able to function in changing network 
environment 
•  Mix of high and low assurance 
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System Architecture 
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Anticipated Technical Advances 
•  Kernel-based fine grain control of trusted subjects  
–  Trusted subject may only access certain objects 
in its trust range  
•  minimizes reliance on correctness of application-
domain security services. 
–  Formal model and architectural solution  define 
“controlled interference”  for trusted subjects. 
•  Subjects “read down” to blocks at lower levels, as 
allowed by kernel 
–  Also, kernel-controlled controlled write-up 
–  Traditional separation kernel architectures lack 
these abilities 
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Anticipated Advances 
•  Exportation of hardware interrupts to client OS. 
–  Enables OS-specific interrupt handling regarding 
subjects’ access violations to individual resources 
–  Traditional separation kernel architectures only provide 
block-level notification 
•  Kernel-based “intransitive information flow” enforcement 
–  Traditionally requires trusted subjects  
–  SecureCore supports, for example, a policy whereby 
each subject may only read down one level, because of 
data integrity or system assurance concerns.   
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Ongoing Work 
•  Least privilege-based security architecture  
–  assured transient-trust in hand-held devices 
–  COTS and highly trusted transactions on single 
platform  
•  Model for kernel-based control  
–  Intransitive information flow  
–  Read-down by virtual machines  
•  Model and hardware support design for temporal 
access control and revocation 
•  Requirements definition for TPM and SP integration for 
Secure Core cryptographic services  
•  Hardware-simulator development for secure HW & SW 
co-design 
•  Distillation of design principles for modern secure 
systems  
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TPM/SP Services Virtualization in SCSS 
•  Goal: services to support networking effort 
–  Storage of secrets required 
•  Virtual functions 
–  Make SP useable by  
•  SCOS, and applications 
•  Specification of SW / HW interface  
•  Identify additional support from 
–  SP 
–  SCSS 
•  Benzel will lead, USC PhD student 
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Platform Support Requirements 
•  Revocation 
–  Extension of TIAC and TIMPS to accommodate highly 
dynamic policies 
–  Integrate TIMPS into ARM with Linux 
•  Modify Linux to use TIMPS 
•  Develop test applications 
–  Will support Transient Trust 
•  Least Privilege and virtualization 
–  SCSS and SCOS domains 
•  Malleable hierarchy of privilege 
–  Requirements for SCOS and SCSS support  
•  Irvine will lead, NPS staff and students 
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Trust in Cluster Head Selection 
•  Cluster heads in ad hoc networks 
•  To date, resource-based cluster head selection 
•  New effort to integrate trust considerations 
•  Problems to be investigated 
–  Attributes for trust negotiation 
–  Event-triggered trust negotiation 
–  SCSS primitives to support trust negotiation 
–  Dynamic transfer of trust 
•  Tension between “right” trust selection and other 
network performance attributes 
•  Irvine and Chiang collaboration, NPS PhD student 
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Protected Communications Channel 
•  SecureCore CONOPS includes both high integrity 
and multilevel channels 
–  Must 
•  Protect network communications 
•  Support external initiation of transient trust 
•  Support applications in transient trust domain 
–  Explore 
•  Existing and emerging protocols 
–  Context: mobile, low power, wireless 
•  Adapt protocols for SecureCore, as needed 
•  Leverage SP support 
•  SCSS primitives to support PCC 
•  Irvine will lead, NPS PhD student 
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Tasks and Metrics 
•  System Level Description 
•  SecureCore Security Services 
•  New Kernel and Hardware Services 
•  New Primitives for Access Control and Revocation 
•  Security Architecture Metrics and Analysis 
•  SecureCore Operating System 
•  Advancement Metrics 
–  Performance and security parameters 
–  Metric definition part of research 
–  Produce scales and points of comparison 
–  Start with Boolean and progress to granular scale 
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Measurement Parameters 
•  Granularity of privilege 
•  Completeness of mandatory policy enforcement 
•  Complexity of relaxed policy enforcement 
•  Factoring and reusability of components 
•  Large label space support 
•  Dynamicity of security policy 
•  Intransitive information flow 
•  Partial ordering of dependencies 
•  Hierarchical trustworthiness of components 
•  Secure Defaults 
•  Performance overhead 
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Annotated Bibliography 
•  50 Years of Hardware/OS Security 
•  Encompasses technical literature from 1951 to 
2001 
•  Focused on system and security-related articles 
•  Reviewed over 360 articles in open literature 
–  Identified all with hardware-relevant 
contributions 
–  Prepared notes on contribution in each article 
•  In preparation for publication 
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Temporal Access Control 
•  Objective: To address revocation 
•  Time Interval Access Control Model (TIAC) 
–  Uses Interval Algebra to define 
•  Time relationships: e.g. before, during, overlaps, etc. 
•  Current time  
•  Subject and object authorization times 
•  Time Interval Memory Protection System (TIMPS) 
–  Temporal analysis of access 
–  Time-aware TLB mechanism 
–  Resource and performance analysis  
–  Logic circuit design 
–  SimpleScalar Prototype using PISA 
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Platform Support Requirements 
•  Revocation 
–  Extension of TIAC and TIMPS to 
accommodate highly dynamic policies 
–  Integrate TIMPS into ARM with Linux 
•  Modify Linux to use TIMPS 
•  Develop test applications 
–  Will support Transient Trust 
•  Least Privilege and virtualization 
–  SCSS and SCOS domains 
•  Malleable hierarchy of privilege 
–  Requirements for SCOS and SCSS 
support 
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Summary 
•  Significant DoD problems being addressed 
–  Revocation 
–  Temporal access control support 
–  Read down from virtual machine 
–  Modeling and assured control of trusted 
subjects 
–  Codesign of HW/Kernel/Services 
–  Unified processor approach 
RCSec 
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Reconfigurable Hardware Problem 
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RCSec Objectives 
•  Adaptive Security and Separation in 
Reconfigurable Hardware 
–  Reconfigurable policy enforcement 
–  Reconfigurable memory protection 
–  Logic separation 
•  Team 
–  UCSB:  
•  Tim Sherwood (PI), Ryan Kastner (Co-PI) 
–  NPS:  
•  Cynthia Irvine (Co-PI), Tim Levin, Thuy Nguyen 
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RCsec  
•  Adaptive Security & Separation in Reconfigurable 
Hardware 
–  Reconfigurable Systems are embedded in 
•  Mars Rover, wireless access points, etc.  
–  Hardware malleability can be twisted  
•  disrupt critical operations 
•  snoop on supposedly secure channels,  
•   physically melt a device.  
–  Need reconfigurable and secure system 
–  Areas to be addressed:  
•  Logic 
•  Memory 
•  Dynamic policy management 
CyberCIEGE 
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CyberCIEGE Motivation 
•  Information Assurance is implicit in everyone’s job 
–  Personnel need to understand their important role in IA 
–  Administrators must know security impact of choices 
–  Managers must understand how IT infrastructure can 
support (or detract) from security policy enforcement 
–  Certifiers must appreciate big-picture security 
•  Problem:  
–  Training and Awareness can be boring 
–  Good security practice is not “automatic” 
•  Should be like washing hands and using seat belts 
–  Many security measures combine for overall security 
•  Complexity is hard to convey and hard to internalize 
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CyberCIEGE Solution 
•  Teaching tool that engages the imagination 
•  Demostrates consequences of security choices 
•  Student/player responsible for organization IT 
–  Keep organization virtual users happy 
•  Purchase hardware and software components 
•  Design networks 
•  Configure components 
•  Manage IT staff 
•  Ensure physical security 
•  Require background checks for certain information access 
•  Provide IA training 
•  Ensure that security does not get in the way of productivity 
–  Protect information assets from cyber threats 
•  Greater asset value  greater attacker motivation 




Goal Goal Goal Goal 
ENTERPRISE (corporation, command, etc.) 
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Risk = Threat x Vulnerability 
Attacker motive to 
compromise assets 
Results of player 
choices 
Too high and the 
player will lose. 
Easy to reduce, but 
inhibits goal 
achievement 
Players manage risk by making 
choices that affect vulnerabilities.   
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PLAYER CHOICES:  
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PLAYER CHOICES:  
Affect computer & network configurations 
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PLAYER CHOICES:  Affect physical security 
Who is allowed to 
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Risk = Threat x Vulnerability 
Player must understand 
attacker motives and 
results of asset 
compromise. 
…so they can make 
informed choices that 
will affect 
vulnerabilities. 
…to manage risk 
such that goals are 
met and assets are 
secured. 
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Elements of CyberCIEGE 
•  Simulation Engine 
–  All security policies & wide variety of security 
mechanisms 
–  Graphics easily added 
•  Scenario Definition Language 
–  Describes how Simulation Engine runs 
–  Rich semantics 
–  Triggers for “plot twists” and to log student progress 
•  Scenario Definition Tool 
–  Supports scenario creation using a GUI 
•  Encyclopedia 
–  How to use the game, security facts, why you lost 
•  Movies supplement encyclopedia  
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